INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR UKRAINE: RECOMMENDATIONS
Co-Chairs of the Working Group On International Security Guarantees for Ukraine_ Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen_ Mr. Andrii Yermak
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This report was prepared based on input and discussions with leading experts fromacross the democratic world. This includes former Prime Ministers, Ministers, as well assenior officials and academics. The co-authors thank all of them for their contributions.
PREAMBLE
Eight years after illegally annexing Crimea, invading the Donbas and fomenting conflictin Ukraine’s East, Russia has attacked Ukraine for the second time. Russian forces havelevelled cities, committed war crimes, and sought to grab Ukraine’s sovereign territory.They have attempted to subdue Ukraine’s population and replace the democraticallyelected leadership in Kyiv. The war in Ukraine has far reaching consequences both forthe region and the world. Stability in the Euro-Atlantic area depends on Ukraine’s security.The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances proved worthless. No sufficientlyrobust, legally and politically binding measures were in place to deter Russianaggression. Unless Ukraine is provided with unique and effective security guarantees –embedded in an eventual peace process – there is no reason to believe that this will nothappen again.Ukraine is on the path to EU membership and as a future EU member will benefit fromthe EU’s own mutual defence clause. Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO and benefit fromits mutual defence arrangements is safeguarded in its Constitution. This aspiration is thesovereign decision of Ukraine. Both NATO and EU membership will significantly bolsterUkraine’s security in the long-term. However, Ukraine needs security guarantees now.These guarantees should enable Ukraine’s self-defence both to deter an armed attack oract of aggression (deterrence by denial), and – in case an attack occurs – to protect thesovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Ukraine (deterrence by punishment).The Kyiv Security Compact will fulfil this purpose by mobilising the necessary political,financial, military, and diplomatic resources for Ukraine’s self-defence. The Compact willconsist of a joint strategic partnership document co-signed by guarantor states andUkraine (as well as bilateral agreements between Ukraine and guarantor states).Alongside reconstruction efforts, these guarantees are key for the millions of Ukrainiansdisplaced by the war to return and build a future in their home country. By designing andadopting them now, they will send a strong message of resolve and unity against theaggressor and for Ukraine’s future. These will be the first such guarantees of the 21 stcentury and can lay the foundations for a new security order in Europe.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
A broader group of international partners including Japan, South Korea, among others,should also support a set of non-military guarantees based on sanctions. It would includesnapback sanctions, which are automatically re-applied in case of further Russianaggression. A legal framework should be developed which will allow authorities to seizethe property of the aggressor, its sovereign funds and reserves, and the assets of itscitizens and entities on the sanctions list. The funds raised should be directed to repairthe war damage inflicted on Ukraine.The guarantees framework may be supplemented by additional agreements, dealing withspecific issues not covered in the layers of guarantees discussed in this document. It mayinclude an agreement, or set of agreements, between Ukraine and countries producinganti-aircraft and anti-missile defense equipment to provide Ukraine with modern andeffective air defense and anti-missile defense systems in sufficient quantity to ensure a”closed sky” from air attacks.The package of guarantees may additionally include regional agreements on the BlackSea with Turkey and other littoral states like Romania and Bulgaria.
• The strongest security guarantee for Ukraine lies in its capacity to defend itselfagainst an aggressor under the UN Charter’s article 51. To do so, Ukraineneeds the resources to maintain a significant defensive force capable ofwithstanding the Russian Federation’s armed forces and paramilitaries.
• This requires a multi-decade effort of sustained investment in Ukraine’sdefence industrial base, scalable weapons transfers and intelligence supportfrom allies, intensive training missions and joint exercises under the EuropeanUnion and NATO flags.
• The security guarantees will be positive; they lay out a range of commitmentsmade by a group of guarantors, together with Ukraine. They need to be bindingbased on bilateral agreements, but brought together under a joint strategicpartnership document – called the Kyiv Security Compact.
• The Compact will bring a core group of allied countries together with Ukraine.This could include the US, UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France,Australia, Turkey, and Nordic, Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries.
A. SECURITY GUARANTEES – COMMITMENTS BY A CORE GROUP OFGUARANTORS REGARDING UKRAINE’S SELF-DEFENCE CAPABILITIES ANDCAPACITIES TO DETER AN ATTACK
CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES
Given its unique geopolitical position, the most effective security guarantees lie inUkraine’s capacity to defend itself. To be sufficiently robust and credible, Ukraine’s self-defence must be underpinned by binding commitments from a group of internationalpartners to mobilise the necessary military and non-military resources.Ukraine is a European country that is now on the path to EU membership. This processwill further integrate Ukraine into the European political community, improve its prospectsfor reconstruction and development, and strengthen the country’s institutions andsecurity. As an EU member, it will also benefit from the EU’s mutual defence clause underArticle 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union. In the meantime, EU Member Statesand institutions should do their part in providing security guarantees to Ukraine throughsustained arms supplies, financial aid, and with training missions, among others.Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO and benefit from its mutual defence arrangements issafeguarded in its Constitution. This aspiration is the sovereign decision of Ukraine. Inthe interim period Ukraine needs iron-clad security guarantees. These will comepredominantly – though not exclusively – from NATO countries.The guarantees must not constrain Ukraine to limit the size or strength of its armedforces. Nor should they be drawn in exchange for a specific status, such as neutrality, orput other obligations or restraints on Ukraine. With those guarantees, Ukraine will sustainits capacity to ensure its self-defence. Their aim is to strengthen Ukraine’s territorialintegrity, sovereignty, and political independence within its internationally recognizedborders. The guarantees should also support Ukraine’s commitment to continuingdemocratic reforms, as specified in the European Council Conclusions of June 23-24,2022 on granting Ukraine EU candidate status. Effective security for Ukraine is closelyrelated to a modern society that guarantees its citizens their fundamental rights.SCOPEThe security guarantees should be codified in a joint strategic partnership documentnamed the Kyiv Security Compact co-signed by a core group of partners that would actas enablers of Ukraine’s self-defence. This could include, but is not limited to, the US,UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and Nordic, Baltic, andCentral European countries. In addition to the strategic partnership document, Ukraineand certain guarantor states may sign bilateral agreements covering specific issuesrelated to security guarantees between Ukraine and the guarantor states.On top of the core guarantors, various layers of countries could join in on additional orspecific issues related to security guarantees. The Rammstein Format (also known asthe Ukraine Defence Contact Group), made up of circa 50 countries, could form the basisof this broader group, which can become formalized into a coalition of the willing.Provisions should be applied for Ukraine to both deter and – if needed – defend againstanother armed attack or acts of aggression. For this, Kyiv will need large defence forces,robust capabilities, and a strong, reformed defence industry. This must be underpinnedby sustained investments in its defence industrial base, extensive weapons transfers andintelligence support from allies, and well-trained and exercised forces.
To defend itself for the long-term Ukraine will need:
• A high-readiness force that can effectively and forcefully respond to aterritorial breach. As stated in NATO’s Madrid Summit Communiqué, Ukraineis ‘vital’ for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. As such and with the supportof key guarantors, Ukraine must be able to develop a robust territorial defenceposture whose ultimate objective is to deter and successfully defend againstacts of aggression. Ukraine needs the resources to maintain a significant forcecapable of withstanding the Russian Federation’s armed forces andparamilitaries.
• A massive training and joint manoeuvre programme of Ukrainian forcesand partners on Ukrainian territory with international trainers andadvisors. Taking advantage of national and multinational training efforts byEU and NATO countries, Ukrainian forces will be trained at NATO standardand at the scale needed to build a robust territorial defence force and reserveforce. The training activities will be supported by an extensive exerciseprogramme both on Ukrainian soil and with Ukrainian forces on EU/NATOterritory. In addition to training programmes, joint manoeuvres under theVienna Document (144) will further strengthen the Ukrainian forces, increasemilitary transparency, and serve regional needs.
• Advanced defensive systems including providing Ukraine withcomprehensive defensive systems to protect key population centres andaccess points by deploying air and maritime missile defence, cybercapabilities, advanced radar capabilities. Those systems – so called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) – could incorporate a mix of home-basedcapabilities and foreign systems. In case of a threat of the use of force oraggression, they could be rapidly augmented by ear-marked systems providedby the key guarantors.
• Access to EU’s capability funding to re-build Ukraine’s defence industrialbase on EU/NATO standards – and develop with EU member states newdefensive capabilities. As a candidate to EU membership, Ukraine could begranted privileged access to EU funding, mainly the European Defence Fundand the European Peace Facility.
• Self-defence territorial force for all civilians aged above 18 years old.Modelled on countries with active conscription, Ukraine will need to maintaina large enough territorial defence force, including a reserve service that canbe sporadically called for active duty.